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Abstract
The ’quiet life hypothesis (QLH)’ posits that banks enjoy the advantages of market
power in terms of foregone revenues or cost savings. We suggest a uni￿ed approach
to measure competition and e￿ciency simultaneously to test this hypothesis. We
estimate bank-speci￿c Lerner indices as measures of competition and test if cost
and pro￿t e￿ciency are negatively related to market power in the case of German
savings banks. We ￿nd that both market power and average revenues declined among
these banks between 1996 and 2006. While we ￿nd clear evidence supporting the
QLH, estimated e￿ects of the QLH are small from an economical perspective.
Key words: Savings banks, competition, e￿ciency, quiet life hypothesis
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1 Introduction
If some market participants possess power to in￿uence (output) prices, neo-
classic theory predicts that these agents, e.g. banks, set prices above marginal
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vins@finance.uni-frankfurt.de (O. Vins).cost in order to maximize pro￿ts. The extraction of producer rents then entails
social welfare losses at the expense of consumers. Alternatively, Hicks (1935)
suggested that producers may forego such rents in return for ine￿ciencies.
This has been coined the "Quiet Life Hypothesis" (QLH) since agents might
prefer to use their market power to behave systematically ine￿cient. 1
According to Rhoades and Rutz (1982), the QLH should apply in particular
to banks since they often avoid to exhibit large abnormal returns with respect
to their ￿duciary duties and due to their regulated status. They are the ￿rst
to show for the US banking industry that banks with market power tend to
reduce risk instead of maximizing pro￿ts. Since the late 1980’s, competition in
the ￿nancial industry soared continuously in the wake of economic integration
and deregulation in both, the United States and Europe. 2 It is thus surprising
that only two recent studies consider the QLH: Berger and Hannan (1998) for
US and Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007) for European banks, re-
spectively. The former ￿nd support for the QLH and show that welfare losses
due to cost ine￿ciencies are substantially larger compared to welfare costs
resulting from monopoly pricing. However, they use a concentration measure
to proxy for market power, which many empirical studies show to be a weak
proxy for competitive behavior (Sha￿er, 2004; FernÆndez de Guevara et al.,
2005). Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007) estimate competitive be-
havior more directly with Lerner indices, which measure the ability of a bank
to set prices above marginal cost (Lerner, 1934). In contrast to Berger and
Hannan (1998), they reject the QLH and report fairly small welfare losses due
to ine￿ciencies relative to those due to market power.
The study of Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007) is an important con-
tribution since it highlights that testing the QLH requires to obtain both
competition and e￿ciency measures simultaneously from a single model. 3
However, they carefully caution that a pooled assessment of competition and
e￿ciency in Europe is subject to care since it compares signi￿cantly di￿er-
ent intermediaries with each other. Bos et al. (2008) show indeed that failure
to account adequately for heterogeneity distorts performance measures, thus
corroborating the suggestion of Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007) to
test the QLH for more homogenous banking samples.
Therefore, we use a proprietary data set provided by the German Savings
1 In fact, some recent bank studies provide evidence on alternative managerial ob-
jectives, for example the desire to build empires (Hughes et al., 2003).
2 See Berger (2007) for a recent overview of international bank e￿ciency compar-
isons, Amel et al. (2004) for an assessment of international implications of consoli-
dation in banking, and Hughes et al. (1996) for a speci￿c test on the implications of
the interstate branching act in the US during the mid-1990s.
3 See also Koetter et al. (2008) for a test of the bias in competition measures when
neglecting bank ine￿ciency.
2Banks Association ("Deutscher Sparkassen und Giroverband, DSGV ") of the
largest banking market in the European Union: Germany. The data includes
detailed ￿nancial account information for all 457 savings banks between 1994
and 2006, such as detailed interest income and expenses per product cate-
gory. These savings banks represent a particularly interesting sample to test
the QLH since they share a common business model but do operate in local
markets with very di￿erent levels of competition. As our analysis shows they
also di￿er signi￿cantly in terms of e￿ciency levels. With this paper we aim to
contribute in three important aspects.
First, we test the QLH for a large and homogenous sample of public banks. A
number of studies report that government owned banks perform worse com-
pared to privately owned peers, for instance in terms of pro￿tability or produc-
tivity proxies. 4 But savings banks have to serve the public by law in Germany.
Hence, worse ￿nancial performance relative to commercial peers may merely
re￿ect this public duty. However, the relative ability to realize optimal pro￿ts
and costs should not be impaired per se by this additional objective and e￿-
ciency is therefore a better benchmark to compare performance. At the same
time, savings banks operate in regionally delineated markets in which they
might enjoy market power (Hempell, 2004). So while their public mandate
prohibits savings banks to exploit (and exhibit) the potential for abnormal
pro￿ts, they might instead be role models of agents that trade market power
for incurring ine￿ciencies (Brunner et al., 2004). Finally, we formulate the
QLH as our null hypothesis because regional politicians often serve on sav-
ings banks’ supervisory boards, which might reduce the likelihood of e￿ciency
enhancing measures that are unpopular with voters, e.g. branch closures.
Second, we consider explicitly ine￿ciencies on the output side, i.e. the poten-
tial ability but unwillingness of banks to charge mark-up prices on outputs
in the presence of market power, rather than measuring ine￿ciencies in the
cost dimension only. This is important because mark-up pricing is at the heart
of the QLH. The available detailed ￿nancial data allows us to estimate - to
our knowledge for the ￿rst time - a pro￿t frontier for a large banking market
outside the US. 5 Therefore, we can allow for systematic deviations from both
optimal pro￿ts and costs, i.e. for pro￿t and cost ine￿ciencies, in a single re-
duced form in the vein of Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007) who only
consider the cost side in their analysis. We obtain not only marginal cost from
a frontier estimation, but also proxies of average revenues that are adjusted for
4 See, for example, Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003), Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy
(2005), and Omran (2007).
5 Virtually all pro￿t frontier analyses concerning non-US banking markets employ
the so-called alternative pro￿t frontier suggested by Humphrey and Pulley (1997),
which requires to specify output volumes as exogenous variables in the reduced form.
This attracted critique by some authors who argue that this assumption violates the
necessary duality requirement between bank production and pro￿t functions.
3any ine￿ciencies. This allows us to determine truely unbiased Lerner indices.
Third, our unique data set allows us to distinguish the output of banks in
much greater detail. In contrast, Berger and Hannan (1998) and Maudos and
FernÆndez de Guevara (2007) specify lumpy output proxies, namely total as-
sets and aggregate loans and deposits, respectively, which is likely to bias
estimated e￿ciency levels as well as Lerner index components (marginal cost
and average revenues). We separate four di￿erent outputs and match these
with according income ￿ows to generate output price proxies.
We ￿nd that German savings banks exhibit on average 83% cost and 53% pro￿t
e￿ciency, a result in line with previous evidence. E￿ciency-adjusted Lerner
margins are on average around 23% during the observation period, corroborat-
ing previous European evidence (Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara, 2007).
This indicates that on average savings banks’ competitive behavior is similar
to other banks. Second stage tobit regressions reveal a statistically signi￿cant
negative relation between cost e￿ciency and Lerner margins. Controlling for
numerous bank-speci￿c and regional market traits, we ￿nd in line with the
QLH that savings banks with more market power also operate less e￿cient
than their peers that are exposed to stronger competition. In contrast, higher
Lerner margins are associated with higher pro￿t e￿ciency, implying that in-
ference on the QLH depends crucially on the dimension of e￿ciency measured.
Furthermore, in line with the public mandate of savings banks we ￿nd that
banks in economically weak regions forgoe more pro￿ts, i.e. are less pro￿t
e￿cient, than in stronger regions.
In section 2 we discuss related literature before introducing the methodology
to jointly estimate competition and e￿ciency measures with stochastic panel
frontier analysis in section 3. Section 4 describes the data. We discuss the
results in section 5 and conclude in section 6.
2 Competition, e￿ciency, and the quiet life hypothesis
The quiet life hypothesis dates back to Hicks (1935). Instead of extracting
rents in a monopolistic market, ￿rms use their market power to allow for
ine￿cient allocation of resources rather than maximizing their pro￿ts since
management’s subjective cost of reaching the optimal pro￿t might very well
outweigh the marginal gains. Leibenstein (1966) argues that welfare losses
due to ￿rm’s misallocation of resources, which he coins X-e￿ciencies, are of
far greater economic importance in market oriented economies than welfare
losses due to monopoly pricing.
Early theoretical studies analyze management discretion and its impact on
4business decisions. For example, Williamson (1963) suggests that managers,
after reaching a certain mandatory pro￿t level, pursue other objectives than
pure pro￿t-maximization such as empire building. Related, Hart (1983) de-
velops a formal model that shows the relationship between competition and
management behavior. He shows that managerial run ￿rms face the problem
of operational slack even if they have optimal incentive schemes in place be-
cause the owner is unable to observe the real cost of production. Hence, she
cannot observe whether high or increasing total cost are due to mismanage-
ment. Competition, however, reduces slack in management behavior. Hermalin
(1992) provides further theoretical evidence on the relationship between com-
petition and managerial action. He proves that increasing competitive pressure
is likely to incite management to work harder and consume less agency goods.
To test the QLH, empirical studies thus need to relate proxies of competition
and e￿ciency at the ￿rm level. Both the empirical bank competition and bank-
ing literature are by now abundant for respective overviews, see for example
Bikker and Haaf (2002b) and Berger (2007). Competition studies frequently
rely either on market concentration measures as a proxy for competition (Shaf-
fer, 1982) or on the Panzar-Rose approach (Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar
and Rosse, 1982). 6 Regarding the latter, Bikker and Haaf (2002a) analyze
competition among small, medium and international banks in 23 countries
between 1988 and 1998. They ￿nd that competition is weakest among small
banks in regional markets. Hempell (2004) analyzes the German market be-
tween 1993 and 1998 and ￿nds at a more detailed level that savings and
cooperative banks are less competitive than credit banks and foreign banks.
Hempell’s ￿ndings support the ones of Bikker and Haaf (2002a) that compe-
tition among larger banks is stronger than among small regional banks.
It is surprising that despite the abundance of competition studies, direct tests
of the QLH are nonetheless still scarce. To our knowledge, Rhoades and Rutz
(1982) are the ￿rst to provide empirical support for the quiet life hypothesis
in the banking industry. They investigate the relationship between market
concentration and risk taking of banks in the US and report that banks tend to
use their market power to reduce portfolio risk rather than to increase pro￿ts.
More recently, Berger and Hannan (1998) empirically analyze more than 500
banks in the US during the 1980’s. They also use market concentration as a
proxy for competition and ￿nd a negative relationship with e￿ciency levels in
the commercial banking industry, thus serving as a more recent evidence of the
QLH. They show that the economic welfare losses associated with operating
6 The PR approach estimates the elasticity of gross revenues with respect to input
prices to measure if suppliers pass input price changes on to consumers. The sum of
partial elasticities, the H-statistic, equals 1 for perfect competition. A value between
0 and 1 for monopolistic competition and it turns negative for a monopoly (see, for
example, Molyneux et al., 1994; De Bandt and Davis, 2000).
5ine￿ciencies derived from certain monopolistic power are far greater than the
relatively small losses attributable to resource misallocations due to higher
prices and lower quantities.
But many studies show that neither concentration nor the PR-approach are
optimal proxies of competition. In particular, the QLH implies a relationship
between market power and e￿ciency at the ￿rm level (Evano￿ and Fortier,
1988; Sha￿er, 2004). But both concentration and PR measures are aggregate in
nature, thus allowing only inference of the competitive stance of some market
aggregate (Bikker and Haaf, 2002a). An alternative measure of competition are
Lerner indices, which originate from the theory of industrial organization. The
basic notion of Hicks has been further developed by, e.g. Appelbaum (1982)
and Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), and entails that banks with market power
set loan prices p above their marginal cost. Competition is then measured
by the margin between average revenues, usually measured by output prices
p, and marginal cost MC scaled by prices (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997;
FernÆndez de Guevara et al., 2005).
Compared to the abundant applications of the PR approach, relatively few
studies employ Lerner indices to measure ￿rm-speci￿c competition. Beighley
and McCall (1975) are presumably the ￿rst to apply the methodology to
the US banking market. Among the more recent studies are Sha￿er (1993)
(Canada) and Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) (Italy). Only recently, Maudos and
FernÆndez de Guevara (2004, 2007) and FernÆndez de Guevara et al. (2005,
2007) measure banking market competition in the European Union with this
￿rm-speci￿c measure. FernÆndez de Guevara et al. (2007), for example, show
that substantial competition di￿erentials persist across countries. They also
report that despite e￿orts of the EU to integrate markets, average market
power (Lerner indices) increased during 1993 and 2000. However, they do not
analyze the implications for ine￿ciency. An explicit test of the QLH is only
available in Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007), which is the study
closest to ours. They report a positive relationship between e￿ciency and
market power in banking markets of the European Union between 1993 and
2002 and thus reject the QLH. Using a translog cost frontier that allows for
ine￿ciency they specify two outputs: aggregate deposits and loans. Lerner
indices are then calculated as the di￿erence between loan (deposit) rates,
interbank rates, and estimated marginal costs of loans (and deposits) obtained
as partial derivatives of the cost frontier, thus, excluding any ine￿ciencies on
the cost side. This approach leaves room for three improvements.
First, the ability to forego output mark-ups vested on ￿rms by market power
is at the heart of the QLH. Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007) advance
beyond previous Lerner studies signi￿cantly by allowing for ine￿ciencies on
the cost side. But they neglect the possibility that realized average revenues
most likely contain an ine￿ciency component, too. This is a re￿ection of the
6usual absence of price data in banking. The proprietary data provided to us
by the DSGV allows us to test more explicitly to what extent banks forego
rents especially on the output side. As we have detailed revenue streams for
all product categories available, we are able to estimate a pro￿t frontier - to
our knowledge this is the ￿rst time for a large banking market outside the US.
We obtain bank-speci￿c measures of pro￿t ine￿ciency and average revenues
net of foregone rents due to ine￿ciencies.
Second, the speci￿cation of two outputs in Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara
(2007) is an improvement to earlier lumpy output speci￿cations as total assets.
But it remains a matter of debate if deposits are bank outputs. Proponents
of the intermediation approach argue that banks employ deposits as factors
to fund loans (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). While this issue seems unlikely to
be fully resolved in the near future two aggregate outputs are still likely to be
noisy proxies for the production process of banks: obviously, processes and cost
to extend a mortgage loan are substantially di￿erent from that of a consumer
loan. This can lead to biased estimates of ine￿ciency and marginal cost. We
avoid these problems and specify a more detailed output vector for savings
banks and complement previous evidence on the QLH based on the widely
accepted theoretical model ￿rst suggested by Sealey and Lindley (1977), the
so-called intermediation approach.
Third, Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007) estimate a single cost func-
tion for all banks (commercial, savings and cooperative) in Europe. Although
they carefully control for a number of other factors that might lead to sys-
tematic deviations from estimated optimal cost, they caution themselves that
the heterogeneity in their sample could pose di￿culties. We follow here their
suggestion and investigate the QLH for a sample of homogenous banks re-
garding their business scope, size, ownership, and unobservable environmental
characteristics. Thereby, we are able to test the QLH based on data that is
less exposed to concerns regarding excessive heterogeneity and poor quality.
3 Methodology
We test the QLH by estimating ￿rm-speci￿c measures of both competition
and e￿ciency simultaneously from a single reduced form as to alleviate endo-
geneity concerns. In contrast to previous QLH studies we account explicitly
for the multi-output nature of bank production and consider explicitly output
pricing ine￿ciencies by estimating a pro￿t frontier to obtain proxies of average
revenues net of ine￿ciency. Akin to Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) and Maudos
and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007) we use Lerner indices to assess the compet-
itive behavior of savings banks in Germany. Competition is measured as the
di￿erence between average revenues, usually measured by output prices p, and
7marginal cost MC scaled by prices (Freixas and Rochet, 1997; FernÆndez de
Guevara et al., 2005):
L =
(p − MC)
p
  (1)
The Lerner index ranges between 0 and 1 where values close to zero describe
highly competitive markets since marginal cost equal average revenues (which
equal prices in perfect competition). Values close to 1 indicate monopolistic
market behavior, i.e. players are able to set prices well above marginal pro-
duction cost and earn a premium.
To obtain the components of the Lerner index, we estimate MC from a bank’s
cost function. We follow the intermediation approach and assume that banks
collect ￿nancial funds from surplus units and employ other production factors
at price wi. They channel collected funds to investors in the form of loans
and other ￿nancial products and services ym conditional on capitalization and
other controls z. If banks are price takers in factor markets, they minimize
total cost by choosing factor quantities subject to a technology constraint
T(y x z). This yields an optimum cost function C∗ = C∗(y w z) that is also
conditional on further controls z. 7 To estimate optimal cost we choose the
translog functional form:
lnCkt(w y z)=αk +
X
i
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X
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where k indicates a bank at time t. Contrary to most competition studies that
specify only total assets as output (Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003), we distin-
guish banks’ portfolios more carefully. We allow for four di￿erent outputs ym:
mortgage loans, consumer loans, corporate loans and Securities. 8 Note that
Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007) treat both deposits and loans as
outputs, restrict inputs to labor and ￿xed assets and specify only operating
cost excluding ￿nancial expenses as dependent variable of the estimation. In
contrast, we follow here the intermediation approach and include ￿nancial ex-
penses in total cost, too, because it is exactly the margin between borrowing
7 We discuss the speci￿c variable choices in section 4.
8 We omit fee-based services because of their small share of savings banks’ total
revenues and the unavailability of consistent volume proxies of these services.
8and lending that serves as an indicator of the bank’s competitive stance. More-
over, since interest expenses account on average for more than 60% of total
expenses, they constitute the crucial component of a bank’s performance and
should therefore be included. Finally, a potential objective of bank managers
implied by the QLH could be to increase market shares and the bank’s size
to signal power and prestige (Hughes et al., 2003). One obvious way to in￿ate
the balance sheet is to o￿er favorable conditions to customers. Thus, excluding
￿nancial expenses neglects an important part of the QLH.
Given the double-log model in equation (2), we obtain the marginal costs MC
component required in equation (1) as:
MC =
X
m
∂ lnC
∂ lnym
×
X
m
C
ym
  (3)
As a second innovation, we use stochastic panel frontier analysis to obtain
cost function parameters in equation (2) used to calculate marginal costs.
Numerous studies show that banks deviate in a non-random fashion from
optimal cost due to either employing simply too many inputs, or allocating
them in suboptimal proportions given factor prices (Amel et al., 2004; Berger,
2007). Neglecting such ine￿ciencies in the error term leads to biased parameter
estimates in the cost function, resulting marginal costs, and hence Lerner
indices. With the exception of Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007), all
competition studies ignore these production ine￿ciencies.
We allow for estimation of ￿rm-speci￿c ine￿ciency and assume a composed
error term, εkt, which consists of random noise, vkt, and ine￿ciency, ukt. Cost
ine￿ciencies are positive εkt = vkt + ukt. 9 In contrast to Maudos and Fer-
nÆndez de Guevara (2007), we obtain parameter estimates with a ￿xed-e￿ect
panel estimator (Greene, 2005). 10 The upshot of this model is twofold. First,
in contrast to most panel frontier estimators bank-speci￿c e￿ciency measures
are time-variant without imposing any structure on their development a priori.
E￿ciency scores are calculated using the conditional expectation of ukt given
εkt and range between 0 and 1, where the latter indicates a fully e￿cient bank.
Second, despite the fact that our sample includes only fairly homogenous sav-
ings banks, unobserved heterogeneity could still pose a problem. Therefore,
we also specify bank-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects αk.
9 We assume the random error term vkt to be i i d  with vkt ∼ N(0,σ2
v) and indepen-
dent of the explanatory variables and the ine￿ciency term, u, following a half-normal
distribution (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). We re-parameterize σ =
p
(σ2
u + σ2
v)
and λ = σu σv. λ indicates the ratio of standard deviation attributable to inef-
￿ciency relative to the standard deviation due to random noise. An insigni￿cant
estimate of λ means that there are no measurable ine￿ciencies.
10 We impose the necessary homogeneity and symmetry restrictions upon estimation.
9The third di￿erence of this study relates to the second critical component to
calculate Lerner indices, average revenues. As depicted in equation (1), average
revenues are usually approximated by total revenues scaled by total assets (e.g.
Maudos and FernÆndez de Guevara (2007) or Angelini and Cetorelli (2003)).
However, the same caveat outlined for costs applies to the pro￿t function of
banks - realized pro￿ts might deviate from predicted optima not only due to
random shocks but also because of systematic de￿ciencies of bankers to choose
production plans so as to maximize pro￿ts.
Therefore, we obtain average revenue proxies in equation (1) as the sum of
predicted average costs ˆ C TA and pro￿ts ˆ π TA, thus, excluding cost and
pro￿t ine￿ciencies. The former are obtained from equation (2). We derive
the latter estimating a standard pro￿t function as suggested by Berger and
Mester (1997). Banks maximize pro￿ts at given factor and output prices and
subject to a technology constraint. Bankers choose quantities based on a vec-
tor of output prices, which yields optimal pro￿ts π(p w z)∗. 11 Note that we
assume that banks face a competitive output market and act as price takers.
A number of studies on pro￿t e￿ciency in the banking industry apply an al-
ternative approach where banks are modeled as price setters (Corvoisier and
Gropp, 2002; DeYoung and Hasan, 1998). Whereas there are also some valid
arguments for this approach, it is also often driven by data availability since
product speci￿c pricing data is not publicly available in most cases (DeYoung
and Hasan, 1998; Maudos et al., 2002). Especially for retail banks, the stan-
dard neoclassical assumption of competitive markets seems to be reasonable ex
ante as retail products are fairly standardized products that can be obtained
at increasingly low transaction costs elsewhere.
The reduced form of this model is similar to equation (2) with output quan-
tities replaced by output prices and the dependent variable being now the
log pro￿ts before valuation lnπ (Berger and Mester, 1997). 12 Accounting for
both cost and pro￿t e￿ciency when estimating Lerner index components is
critical. For example, if pro￿t ine￿ciency is neglected, predicted pro￿ts will
be downward biased because ine￿ciency u entailing lower than optimal prof-
its lnπ = f(p w z) + v − u. Hence, predicted average revenues would be too
low, potentially underestimating the level of Lerner rents or, more precisely,
con￿ning Lerner rents with foregone rents due to ine￿cient exploitation of the
bank’s pricing opportunity set.
In sum, we obtain Lerner index components, average revenues and marginal
11 Note that banks’ abilities to choose input quantities at given factor cost w implies
that cost ine￿ciency is also considered in this model.
12 A detailed reduced form is available upon request. We exclude valuation e￿ects
since they are lagged by several years, are highly dependent on the economic cy-
cle, and are used by bank managers discretionary to smooth income. Result are
qualitatively identical if pro￿t after valuation is used.
10cost, from stochastic cost and pro￿t panel analysis and thus avoid confusion
of realized rents due to market power and rents foregone due to ine￿ciencies.
We account explicitly for multiple outputs of banks and also consider ￿nancial
expenses when estimating e￿ciency and Lerner indices to test the QLH more
explicitly.
4 Data
To estimate the cost frontier we specify four outputs y1    4 (mortgage loans,
consumer loans, corporate loans, and securities) and three input prices w1    3
(personnel cost, the cost of funding, and expenses for ￿xed assets). To estimate
the pro￿t frontier, we specify four output prices p1    4 (interest rates on mort-
gages, consumer loans, corporate loans, and securities). The according data is
depicted in table 1. We also control for equity to account for di￿erent capital
structures and risk-preferences among banks. The data is obtained from the
German Savings Banks Association’s (DSGV) Bank Performance Comparison
and covers the period from 1996 to 2006. Balance sheet data is calculated as
annual averages of monthly data to permit the combination with annual pro￿t
and loss account data to calculate according ratios.
All data are in￿ation-adjusted using the consumer price index and expressed
in millions of 2000 e. The panel is balanced since the DSGV integrated back-
wards ￿nancial accounts of savings banks that merged during the observation
period. The sample contains 457 incumbent banks at year-end 2006. After
elimination of 93 missing values, the sample contains 4,934 observations for
the period from 1996-2006.
Although all savings banks follow the same basic operating model, o￿er similar
products and cater to the same general type of customers, the size of the
institutions di￿ers signi￿cantly from small local banks with only a few hundred
millions in total assets to sizeable regional banks with total assets exceeding
ten billion. At the same time they also di￿er in terms of factor cost. Labor
cost, for example, are more than 20 per cent higher for the top quartile than
for the bottom quartile. The same is true for funding cost, which di￿er by
almost 35 per cent between the top and the bottom quartile. The diversity
among otherwise similar banks underpins the suitability of this sample to test
the QLH.
11Table 1
Descriptive statistics savings bank production 1996-2006
Variable Mean SD Min 25%p 75%p Max
Total operating cost TOC 99.8 133.5 5.4 33.6 115.5 1,701.6
Pro￿t before valuation and tax PBV 21.6 28.8 0.4 7.7 24.7 409.3
Outputs
Mortgage Loans y1 587.8 841.2 16.5 183.7 691.6 10,836.9
Consumer loans y2 150.0 209.5 5.8 44.8 177.7 3,429.8
Corporate Loans y3 420.1 638.0 11.8 119.8 479.0 8,567.5
Securities y4 561.6 745.9 3.1 177.4 632.3 6,910.9
Factor cost
Labor cost w1 53.1 7.3 30.8 48.8 58.3 95.9
Cost of funding w2 3.8 0.7 2.0 3.2 4.4 5.6
Cost ￿xed assets w3 50.6 25.7 13.4 36.9 57.0 543.3
Output prices
Interest rate mortgages p1 5.9 0.9 3.8 5.2 6.6 8.6
Interest rate consumer loans p2 8.8 2.4 2.1 6.6 11.1 14.5
Interest rate corporate loans p3 8.4 1.5 2.9 7.4 9.4 15.7
Interest rate securities p4 5.2 1.2 1.7 4.2 6.0 8.7
Controls
Equity z 110.7 154.9 4.2 33.8 126.8 2,172.7
Notes: 4,934 observations. Total operating cost TOC, Pro￿t before valuation and taxes PBV ,
equity z and all output volumes y1-y4 denoted in millions of 2000 Euros. Labor cost in
thousands of Euros per employee (FTE). Funding and ￿xed asset cost in percentages of
total borrowed funds and total ￿xed assets, respectively. All output prices represent average
interest rates in percent.
5 Results
Speci￿cation Parameter estimates of both cost and pro￿t frontier are depicted
in table 7 in the appendix. Recall that λ equals the ratio of standard de-
viation attributable to ine￿ciency relative to the standard deviation due to
random noise. An insigni￿cant estimate of λ means that there are no mea-
surable ine￿ciencies. All of the error is due to random noise and speci￿cation
of a stochastic frontier model is inappropriate. The signi￿cant coe￿cients of
both λ and σ support the existence of systematically skewed error terms and,
hence, ine￿ciency. Log-likelihood ratio tests con￿rm this result, thereby un-
derpinning the statistical relevance to account for a composed error term. 13
Table 2 shows average cost e￿ciencies for savings banks of 83% and average
13 We also tested for alternative speci￿cations, such as the exclusion of time trends to
capture technological change, alternative output mixes with fewer products provided,
and simpler functional forms such as the Cobb-Douglas. All of these were rejected
and results are available upon request.
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Results of e￿ciency and Lerner estimates
Variable Mean SD Min 25%p 75%p Max
Cost e￿ciency CE 0.828 0.039 0.519 0.808 0.855 0.919
Pro￿t e￿ciency PE 0.534 0.096 0.038 0.476 0.606 0.757
Lerner index Lerner 0.237 0.057 0.064 0.196 0.277 0.520
Notes: 4,934 observations in the period 1996-2006.
pro￿t e￿ciencies of 53.4%, which is in line with previous studies that analyse
both e￿ciency dimensions (Altunbas et al., 2001; Koetter, 2006). The signi￿-
cantly lower e￿ciency levels on the pro￿t side con￿rm the importance of slack
in banks abilities to generate pro￿ts rather than their abilities to scrutinize
on expenditures. 14
Lerner indices are on average 23.7% con￿rming other studies, for example,
FernÆndez de Guevara et al. (2007) who report indices for European banks on
the order of 20-30%. The high level of pro￿t ine￿ciencies is in line with the
original idea of the quiet life hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973): the best rent of a
monopoly is the absence of pressure to maximize pro￿ts. On the one hand, this
suggests that savings banks can indeed a￿ord considerable ine￿ciencies in the
revenue generating dimension of their business due to (local) market power
and their integration in the overall network of public banks. On the other
hand, high pro￿t ine￿ciencies can re￿ect alternative, societal objectives. The
savings bank law of the state of Baden-W￿rttemberg, for example, states that
it is the objective of savings banks to provide all people in their region with
bank services, take deposits from them and grant loans to them. It is their
duty to support the local municipality ("Gemeinde") in the ful￿lment of its
economical, political, social and cultural tasks. Ideally, we would be able to
include such additional benevolent activities as an output of savings banks
and account thereby explicitly for the use of resources on outputs other than
￿nancial products and services. But since according data is unavailable, more
formal tests are unfortunately infeasible. At the same time it is important to
note that PE scores are relative measures within the group of savings banks
only. Hence, even without an explicit speci￿cation of such benevolent out-
puts the result highlights that at least some savings banks appear to realize
substantially higher pro￿ts at given production plans than others.
Competition and size Most studies hypothesize that market power increases
with ￿rm’s size. Figure 1 (left-hand side) depicts the relationship between
mean Lerner indices, corrected for both cost and pro￿t ine￿ciencies, and total
14 The low correlation of appr. 20% between cost and pro￿t e￿ciency indicates that
pro￿t ine￿ciencies can only partially be explained with ine￿ciencies on the produc-
tion side.
13assets for each individual savings bank in the observation period 1996-2006.
Contrary to this hypothesis the ￿tted line plot in the scatter graph suggests
that larger banks tend to exhibit lower Lerner margins. This, however, might
be due to the fact that larger banks are often located in larger cities, which
tend to be more competitive.
Figure 1. The relationship between e￿ciency and bank size
Cost e￿ciency shown in the right-hand panel of ￿gure 1) appears to be slightly
higher for large banks than for smaller ones, which might be due to scale
economies. Especially the variation in cost e￿ciency seems to be signi￿cantly
higher among small banks. All savings banks with total assets above 15 billion
Euros show cost e￿ciency levels beyond 75% whereas a sizeable number of
smaller banks is associated with cost e￿ciency levels below 75%. However,
the most e￿cient banks in the sample are small ones, too. Thus, size is not
per se a prerequisite for e￿ciency. There is no apparent relationship between
pro￿t e￿ciency levels and size.
Dynamics Note that our prime interest is here to test the quiet life hypothesis
rather than ’explaining’ e￿ciency scores. 15 To further explore the charac-
teristics of both competition and e￿ciency consider ￿gure 2 exhibiting the
15 Which, in itself, is anything but a trivial issue for both economic and econometric
reasons surrounding the ’Greene’ problem (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
14dynamic development of either measure as well as the most important Lerner
components.
Figure 2. Competition, e￿ciency, and components
The bottom right graph of ￿gure 2 shows average revenues falling over the
whole period 1996 to 2006 from 7.2% to 5.3% 16 . This, together with constant
or even increasing marginal cost, led to Lerner indices plummeting from 32%
in 1996 to below 18% around the turn of the century. Thereafter, banks were
able to stabilize margins by successfully reducing marginal cost (graph bottom
left). Falling average revenues might be attributable to two casually observed
industry trends. First, competition signi￿cantly increased due to new (foreign)
competitors that entered markets and a surging penetration of online banking
services. 17 Second, interest rate levels were declining continuously during the
observed period. 18 It is interesting to note that banks were not able to pro￿t
from decreasing interest rates through decreasing marginal cost until 2001.
This is another sign for the relatively strong competition on the deposit side.
16 Pro￿t before valuation over total assets.
17 According to ￿gures from the German Central Bank deposits of non-banks held by
foreign banks increased some 15-fold between 1996 and 2006 whereas savings banks
increased their volume by just 75%. Similarly, loans to private customers extended
by foreign banks increased 18-fold in the same period whereas savings banks volumes
increased by 127%.
18 1Y-EURIBOR dropped from 6.3% in 1996 to 3.8% in 2006.
15Note that the reduction in average marginal cost from 5.2% in 2001 to 4.3% in
2006 is not due to better cost management per se. In fact, the relative ability
to minimize costs remained fairly stable at high levels of 83% as depicted in
the upper right panel of ￿gure 2. Pro￿t e￿ciency levels increase slightly during
the period year-on-year but do take a hit during the market turmoils in the
year 2001.
Determinants Figure 3 depicts the univariant relationship between market
power, cost e￿ciency and pro￿t e￿ciency. The graph suggests that market
power is slightly negatively correlated with cost e￿ciency in line with the QLH.
The opposite relationship seems to exist with regard to pro￿t e￿ciency. The
relatively ￿at slope of the ￿tted line indicates that the e￿ects are economically
not signi￿cant though.
Figure 3. The relation between e￿ciency and market power
However, univariant statistics may be misleading since they cannot grasp pos-
sible interactions between e￿ciency, competition, further bank-speci￿c and
other traits. Therefore, we use panel regressions to investigate the relation be-
tween cost and pro￿t e￿ciency and Lerner indices more carefully. As noted by
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), the truncated nature of the former requires an
according empirical speci￿cation and we choose here a panel tobit estimator
with bank-speci￿c ￿xed-e￿ects.
In addition to Lerner indices, we use four di￿erent sets of explanatory co-
16variates to predict cost and pro￿t e￿ciency scores, respectively. Speci￿cally,
we investigate the relation between e￿ciency and bank’s competitive stance
controlling for other bank traits (size, performance, business mix), potential
impact of mergers and characteristics of the local market including the lo-
cal market structure. 19 We explain the construction of each covariate subse-
quently when discussing the results. 20
Column (1) in table 3 and table 4 depicts the core relation of the QLH, namely
the relation between e￿ciency and competition. The results are highly signif-
icant for both, cost and pro￿t e￿ciency, but do di￿er in their respective sign.
Whereas the relation between market power ( Lerner) and cost e￿ciency is
negative and, thus, in line with the predictions of the Quiet Life Hypothesis,
the relation between market power and pro￿t e￿ciency is positive. The latter
￿nding provides some support for the so-called e￿cient-structure-hypothesis
(Berger, 1995). Note that we do not imply a causal relationship. In fact, the
relation between competition and e￿ciency is most likely characterized by
complex contemporaneous and lagged relations, which up and until here re-
main largely unknown on theoretical grounds. We therefore limit ourselves
throughout to draw inference on relations rather than causation. 21
The sign and magnitude of reported elasticities remain unchanged as we add
further controls for banks and market characteristics (columns (2)-(5) in table
3 and 4). 22 Hence, the results provide evidence for the QLH with regard to
cost e￿ciency. In other words, savings banks with high market power tend
to incur higher operating cost to produce the same output compared to their
peers with less market power. Assuming that management behavior - rather
than ability - is the cause for di￿erences in e￿ciency levels, competition seems
to have a disciplinary impact on management behavior. This is in line not only
with the QLH but also with more formal models like in Hart (1983). However,
note that the economic relevance is rather low as indicated by the elasticities
reported in the tables. A one per cent change in the Lerner index (for an
average savings bank) lowers the cost e￿ciency level by approximately 0.09%.
19 The bank-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ect controls for potentially omitted variables. We use
heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors, and we control for time-speci￿c e￿ects
by including time dummies as well. Alternatively, we also used a standard ￿xed
e￿ects regression. Results are qualitatively identical and available upon request.
20 Tables 5 and 6 in the appendix provide descriptive statistics and a correlation ma-
trix and subdues multicollinearity concerns, respectively. We also tested proxies on
retail to corporate accounts, the account share of small entrepreneurial customers,
and the account share of international customers to assess whether these character-
istics in￿uence saving banks competitive stance, too. Since results were insigni￿cant
across the board we conserve on space and do not report them here.
21 Note, however, that we also allowed for endogeneity by using IV tobit estimation.
Results were una￿ected.
22 Coe￿cients instead of elasticities are available upon request.
17Thus, an increase of the Lerner index by 40% from 20% to 28% (the di￿erence
between the lowest and the highest quartile in our sample) will result, ceteris
paribus, in a decrease of the cost e￿ciency level by 3 percentage points from
83% to 80%.
18Table 3
The relation between cost e￿ciency, competition and other bank traits
Tobit estimation with bank and time speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects of cost e￿ciency indices on bank-speci￿c and regional characteristics. Figures
reported in table are elasticities. Explanatory variables: Lerner index (0=highly competitive, 1=monopolistic behavior): Lerner; Gross
total assets (in billion EUR): TA; Fee over interest income (in percent): NII; Mortgage loan share (in percent): MLS; Loan loss reserves
per total assets (in percent): LLR; M&A dummy indicating merger in particular year: MA; Population density (in thousand inhabitants
per square kilometer): POP; Primary income per inhabitant (in thousand EUR): INC; GDP growth (in percent): GDPG; Number of
banks operating in the region (based on commuter streams): BANKS. Constant included in estimation but not reported. 457 savings
banks included in the observation period from 1996-2006 in column (1)-(3), 93 observations deleted due to missing data; observation period
in column (4)-(5) limited to 1996-2004 due to availability of economic data. Rho measures the explanatory power of the bank speci￿c ￿xed
e￿ect.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lerner index Lerner -0.0716*** -0.0787*** -0.0792*** -0.0906*** -0.0919***
Gross total assets TA 0.0017** 0.002*** 0.0017* 0.0018**
Fee over interest income NII -0.0319*** -0.0321*** -0.0374*** -0.0376***
Mortgage loans over total loans MLS -0.0149*** -0.0151*** -0.0161*** -0.0151***
Loan loss reserves over total assets LLR -0.0171*** -0.0174*** -0.018*** -0.0177***
M&A activity MA -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005***
Population per area POP 0.0013 0.0006
Primary Income INC -0.0068 -0.015**
GDP growth GDPG -0.0009** -0.001**
Number of banks in Region BANKS 0.0067***
Observations 4934 4934 4934 4006 4006
Number of banks 457 457 457 457 457
Rho 0.08 0.1 0.11 0.14 0.13
Notes: Robust standard errors and time-speci￿c e￿ects not reported. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
1
9Table 4
The relation between pro￿t e￿ciency pe, competition and other bank traits
Tobit estimation with bank and time speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects of cost e￿ciency indices on bank-speci￿c and regional characteristics. Figures
reported in table are elasticities. Explanatory variables: Lerner index (0=highly competitive, 1=monopolistic behavior): Lerner; Gross
total assets (in billion EUR): TA; Fee over interest income (in percent): NII; Mortgage loan share (in percent): MLS; Loan loss reserves
per total assets (in percent): LLR; M&A dummy indicating merger in particular year: MA; Population density (in thousand inhabitants
per square kilometer): POP; Primary income per inhabitant (in thousand EUR): INC; GDP growth (in percent): GDPG; Number of
banks operating in the region (based on commuter streams): BANKS. Constant included in estimation but not reported. 457 savings
banks included in the observation period from 1996-2006 in column (1)-(3), 93 observations deleted due to missing data; observation period
in column (4)-(5) limited to 1996-2004 due to availability of economic data. Rho measures the explanatory power of the bank speci￿c ￿xed
e￿ect.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lerner index Lerner 0.044** 0.0529*** 0.0524*** 0.0708*** 0.0742***
Gross total assets TA -0.0004 0.0006 0.0021 0.0019
Fee over interest income NII -0.0205* -0.0215** -0.0491*** -0.0504***
Mortgage loans over total loans MLS -0.0568*** -0.0575*** -0.099*** -0.0985***
Loan loss reserves over total assets LLR -0.0605*** -0.0614*** -0.0334*** -0.0336***
M&A activity MA -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0019***
Population per area POP -0.0081** -0.007**
Primary income INC 0.0728*** 0.0849***
GDP growth GDPG -0.0012 -0.0011
Number of banks in Region BANKS -0.0095
Observations 4934 4934 4934 4006 4006
Number of banks 457 457 457 457 457
Rho 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08
Notes: Robust standard errors and time-speci￿c e￿ects not reported. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
2
0In column (2) we add bank size, accounting based performance measures and
proxies for the business mix of each bank. Bank size is measured by gross
total assets TA. Performance indicators include total loan loss reserves scaled
by total assets LLR as an indicator for the risks taken by the bank in the
loan business. With fee income over interest income FEE and the share of
mortgages of total assets MLS we control for banks’ e￿orts to venture into al-
ternative businesses to avoid the increasingly narrow-margined credit business.
The share of fee income controls for the neglect of the former as output in the
intermediation model used to estimate pro￿t and cost e￿ciency. Thus, savings
banks with a higher share of fee business tend to obtain lower e￿ciency ratios
as labor dedicated to fee business is included in total operating cost but the
corresponding output is neglected. All coe￿cients are highly signi￿cant and
show the expected sign. It is worth mentioning that an increase in size results
in a slight but signi￿cant increase in cost e￿ciency, which indicates bene￿ts
from exploiting scale economies. Size has no signi￿cant in￿uence, however, on
pro￿t e￿ciency. A higher share of mortgage business and more risky loans
are associated with lower cost e￿ciency, which is reasonable as mortgages
and riskier loans normally require more intensive maintenance. For the stated
reasons above, the negative sign associated with the share of fee income is
expected. The same ￿ndings hold for the pro￿t e￿ciency.
In column (3) we add a control for merger activities MA. Cost e￿ciency drops
in the year of merger activities, which is expected as resources are bound in
merger related activities on the detriment of output. With regard to the pro￿t
side Bloch and Vins (2007) show that merger activities can result in temporary
adverse e￿ects on the revenues of a bank. A signi￿cantly negative coe￿cient
on the pro￿t side con￿rms these ￿ndings.
Furthermore, we include a couple of controls for the local economic environ-
ment in column (4): the population density POP to distinguish between urban
and rural regions, the primary income per inhabitant INC to control for re-
gional prosperity and the growth in GDP GDPG to take the local economic
development into account. Results are mixed. With regard to cost e￿ciency
only GDP growth seems to have a negative impact. On the pro￿t side, pop-
ulation density has a signi￿cant negative impact and regional prosperity a
positive one. The latter e￿ect might be a result of the aforementioned public
duty of savings banks: they might forgoe some pro￿ts in less developed regions
to foster the local economic development.
We further control for the market structure by including the number of banks
in the economic planning region ("Raumordnungsregion, ROR") in column
(5). 23 This proxy is one of the few structural measures, which are also avail-
23 Of which 97 are de￿ned based on commuter streams in Germany. Funke and
Niebuhr (2005) argue that this spatial taxonomy re￿ects economic interdependencies
21able for the large nationwide operating retail banks at a local level. There
is a positive relation between the number of banks and cost e￿ciency and
no signi￿cant relation regarding pro￿t e￿ciency. Note that these results mir-
ror our main ￿ndings with regard to the Lerner index. Savings banks with
more potential competitors operate more cost e￿cient. Based on the idea of
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, a greater number of competitors
goes along with more competitive behavior of the market participants.
Finally, bank speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects explain part of the variation of both cost
and pro￿t e￿ciency as measured by Rho of 4% and 14%, respectively. Thus,
savings bank e￿ciency is in￿uenced signi￿cantly by unobserved factors such
as certain technologies, know-how or just management competency.
To check for the potential problem of endogeneity between Lerner indices and
e￿ciency, we also estimate a IV tobit model instrumenting the Lerner index
with itself lagged by one period. Results are qualitatively identical since the
coe￿cient of the Lerner index remains unchanged. We also run the analysis
excluding all savings banks involved in merger activities to control for potential
selection biases due to the backward integration in our data set of banks that
merged during the observation period. Again, results remain unchanged. 24
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we suggest three main innovations to test the quiet life hypoth-
esis (QLH) among banks. First, we obtain bank-speci￿c measures of both cost
and pro￿t e￿ciency as well as market power (Lerner index) simultaneously
from a single reduced form. This allows us explicitly to take the possibility
into account that savings banks forego potential pro￿ts in the output pricing
dimension rather than due to suboptimal sourcing decision. Second, we use a
unique sample of all savings banks operating in Germany between 1996 and
2006 provided by the German Savings Banks Association ("DSGV"). Paired
with the use of panel-frontier estimation this alleviates concerns of excessive
heterogeneity of cross-country studies. Finally, the available detailed ￿nancial
data on both stock and ￿ow variables allows us to account more explicitly for
the diversity of bank’s asset portfolios (outputs) compared to previous studies.
Our main ￿ndings are the following three.
First, we estimate cost and pro￿t functions for German savings banks using
stochastic cost and pro￿t panel frontier analysis. In line with previous evi-
dence, we ￿nd that savings banks could have produced the same output with
much better than political units.
24 Results available on request.
2283% of actual cost. Foregone pro￿ts, in turn, are much higher since mean
pro￿t e￿ciency is only 53%. This may suggest that German savings banks
conduct unpro￿table or less pro￿table business to ful￿ll their public duty, e.g.
charge lower interest rates than appropriate based on the risk involved or
provide current accounts to the poor. 25 Alternatively, it may indicate that
savings banks can a￿ord not to fully exploit pro￿t opportunities. Since pro￿t
e￿ciency scores are relative measures and because we benchmark here only
savings banks, any potential omitted variable bias (i.e. charitable activities)
appears to apply di￿erently to the population of savings banks. Therefore,
it seems likely that at least some savings banks realize substantially higher
pro￿ts given a production plan than others, thereby contributing to optimal
pro￿t estimates fairly high above what the majority of savings fails to realize.
Therefore, we derive marginal cost and average revenue estimates to calculate
Lerner indices as competition proxies that avoid to con￿ne market power with
ine￿ciency on the basis of estimated e￿cient frontiers. Adjusted Lerner indices
are on average 24%, which is also in line with results reported in cross-country
studies of European banking markets. This result indicates that savings banks
indeed possess some market power. However, we also ￿nd that the competitive
stance is rather dispersed with a di￿erence of 8 percentage points between
the 25% and the 75% quantile. Furthermore, we ￿nd that average market
power has been falling within our observation period from 32% to 19%, thus,
indicating a sizable increase in competition in local retail banking markets. At
the same time average revenues over total assets declined from 7.2% to 5.3%,
which can partially be attributed to this increase in competition.
Third, we employ panel tobit regressions with ￿xed e￿ects to estimate the
relationship between e￿ciency and market power (Lerner indices), thereby
testing the Quiet Life Hypothesis of Hicks (1935) more explicitly. We ￿nd a
slightly negative relationship between cost e￿ciency and the Lerner index.
This supports the QLH and implies that more market power induces banks to
also incur more slack in the operating dimension of their business. The relation
between pro￿t e￿ciency and market power, however, is signi￿cantly positive.
This does not lend support to the QLH. 26 Although statistically highly signif-
icant, both e￿ects are of little economic signi￿cance. The maximum di￿erence
in the range of observed Lerner values in￿uences, ceteris paribus, the cost
e￿ciency levels of an average savings bank by only 3 to 4 percentage points.
In sum, we cannot reject the possibility of a quiet life among German sav-
25 The variation in systematic abilities to realize pro￿ts could not be explained by
di￿erences in donations and other social activities since these are, to our knowledge,
included in extraordinary expenses, which are not part of the operating pro￿t ￿gure
used in our analysis.
26 It is rather in line with the so-called structure-performance paradigm which posits
that only the most e￿cient banks remain in the market and shape it’s structure.
23ings banks. Especially on the operating side, higher Lerner margins of savings
banks, i.e. higher market power, are associated with cost ine￿ciencies. It is
worthwhile to note, however, that we cannot control in this study explicitly
for the (di￿erent) measures of savings banks to support the local communi-
ties out of their operating business, e.g. by sta￿ using some of their time for
activities not associated with the operating business. In the same vein we ￿nd
on the pro￿t side that savings banks in poorer areas tend to be less pro￿t
e￿cient lending support to the idea that they forgoe pro￿ts to support the
local economy. While we argue that this most likely a￿ects only the level of
mean e￿ciency rather than it’s relation to competition, future research on the
role of such activities is certainly fruitful.
24Appendix
Table 5
Descriptives of explanatory variables
Variable Mean SD Min 25%p 75%p Max
Lerner index Lerner 0.24 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.28 0.52
Gross total assets TA 2,015 2,701 108 687 2,316 31,794
Fee/interest income NII 22.04 4.89 4.99 18.79 25.01 53.04
Mortgage loans/total loans MLS 39.76 13.84 4.75 29.01 51.48 80.46
Loan loss reserves/total assets LLR 3.61 1.37 0.04 2.67 4.46 9.82
Population per area POP 0.54 0.66 0.04 0.13 0.77 4.01
Primary income per inhabitant INC 18.23 3.53 10.08 16.15 20.48 29.58
GDP growth GDPG 2.12 3.09 -15.25 0.39 3.75 26.28
Number of banks in region BANKS 76 37 14 53 90 222
Notes: Lerner index (Lerner) as markup over price; total assets (TA) in millions of 2000 Euros; Fee
over interest income (NII) in percent; Mortgage loans over total loans ( MLS) in percent, Loan loss
reserves over total assets (LLR) in percent; Population per area (POP) in thousand people per square
kilometer; Primary income per inhabitant ( INC) in thousand Euros per inhabitant; GDP growth
(GDPG) in per cent; Number of banks (BANKS) indicates the number of banking institutions
operating in the same region according to the statistics of the central bank. All data available
for period 1996-2006 (4,934 observations), except macroeconomic data ( POP, INC, GDPG) only
available from 1996-2004 (4,007 observations).
Table 6
Correlations between ￿xed e￿ect tobit regression covariates
Lerner TA NII MLS LLR MA POP HHINC GDPC
Lerner 1.00
TA -0.06 1.00
NII 0.26 0.04 1.00
MLS -0.37 0.07 -0.12 1.00
LLR -0.02 0.03 -0.31 0.01 1.00
MA -0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 1.00
POP -0.01 0.54 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.05 1.00
HHINC -0.32 0.22 0.33 -0.01 -0.17 0.02 0.17 1.00
GDPC 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.08 0.03 1.00
BANKS 0.09 0.20 0.22 -0.09 -0.10 0.00 0.34 0.43 0.04
25Table 7
Parameter estimates stochastic cost and pro￿t frontier
Cost e￿ciency estimate Pro￿t e￿ciency estimate
Beta p-value Beta p-value
A1 0.663 0.000 Q1 0.081 0.783
A2 0.304 0.009 Q2 -8.782 0.000
B1 0.441 0.000 R1 5.448 0.000
B2 -0.142 0.054 R2 3.159 0.000
B3 0.727 0.000 R3 1.638 0.009
B4 0.638 0.000 R4 -0.880 0.036
C1 -0.790 0.000 S1 0.742 0.000
A11 0.072 0.413 Q11 0.838 0.003
A12 -0.054 0.514 Q12 2.721 0.000
A22 0.037 0.672 Q22 -3.062 0.000
B11 0.038 0.014 R11 3.122 0.003
B12 -0.029 0.012 R12 -0.236 0.523
B13 0.036 0.026 R13 -0.678 0.150
B14 -0.167 0.000 R14 0.013 0.972
B22 0.069 0.000 R22 0.152 0.572
B23 -0.009 0.335 R23 0.060 0.812
B24 -0.028 0.000 R24 0.398 0.025
B33 0.037 0.047 R33 1.822 0.000
B34 -0.098 0.000 R34 -0.122 0.607
B44 0.226 0.000 R44 -0.291 0.020
C11 -0.235 0.000 S11 0.017 0.022
D11 -0.031 0.441 T11 -2.078 0.000
D12 0.016 0.704 T12 -0.028 0.962
D21 0.129 0.000 T21 -1.390 0.000
D22 -0.124 0.000 T22 0.942 0.001
D31 -0.159 0.000 T31 -0.309 0.302
D32 0.180 0.000 T32 -0.621 0.045
D41 -0.150 0.000 T41 0.138 0.443
D42 0.126 0.000 T42 -0.167 0.500
E11 0.119 0.000 U11 0.046 0.466
E21 -0.007 0.636 U21 0.046 0.130
E31 0.059 0.004 U31 0.019 0.624
E41 0.050 0.001 U41 -0.026 0.390
F11 0.238 0.000 V11 0.097 0.013
F21 -0.229 0.000 V21 -0.194 0.000
G1 -0.075 0.000 W1 -0.036 0.478
G2 0.001 0.132 W2 0.004 0.033
G11 0.006 0.120 W11 0.062 0.244
G12 -0.008 0.003 W12 0.057 0.026
G13 0.011 0.000 W13 0.013 0.681
G14 0.008 0.000 W14 0.024 0.191
G21 0.005 0.624 W21 -0.049 0.125
G22 -0.004 0.686 W22 -0.097 0.007
G31 -0.019 0.000 W31 -0.007 0.052
σ 0.832 0.000 σ 2.897 0.000
λ 12.708 0.000 λ 14.112 0.000
Notes: σ = σu + σv
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